

Jakarta in a Time of Political and Economic Change: Capital Transformation, City Resilience, and Collaborative Governance

Muhamad Iksan, Jenn-Jaw Soong, and Muhammad Fajar Anandi

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Abstract: This paper explores three main topics pertinent to a better description of Jakarta in the time of economic and political changes. The first topic illustrates how the Indonesian central government gradually conducts the capital transformation to Nusantara. The second depicts challenges for the city of Jakarta involving acute environmental and human-made problems: floods, sea level rise with severe land subsidence and traffic congestions. The third topic suggests a collaboration among key stakeholders. The central government emphasizes main resources to foster a joint action among ministries and agencies in the newly established city authority agency and coordination with international communities, donors, and investors, for successful capital development. The Jakarta local government coordinates the public and private sources to revitalize the city under the urban regeneration vision of 2030. The orchestrated efforts for constructive cooperation between central and local government culminates in the main argument of this paper which discusses collaborative governance with starting conditions as an important factor.

Keywords: Jakarta city, Nusantara new capital, capital transformation, collaborative governance, and management-administration-policy issues

JEL: H54, H61, H83, O18, O53

1. Introduction

The capital city and mega-urban development was a landmark to one nation's progress. There are no developed countries whose capital city and mega cities are not thriving and growing as a resilient city. Japan has Tokyo, United States has New York and Washington DC, Germany has Bonn and Berlin and so on¹. The list goes on and on. However, for a developing country such as Indonesia, its current experiences, the relocation of the capital city including a physical move of the central state apparatus from one location to another, is labelled by capital transformation, requires huge efforts, timely planning, as well as execution. At the same time, previous capital needs to be supported so that the capital transformation does not turn into economic and political shocks (Glaeser, 2022) and may function properly as an instrument for the nation and state building (Schatz, 2003). In addition, the loss of capital city status can enormously harm the urban area, e.g., Jakarta, as political shifts could result in businesses and the wealthy leaving urban areas (Glaeser, 2022, p. 3).

Relocating Indonesia's capital from Jakarta to Nusantara was a momentous political and administrative choice made by the current government. President Widodo had decided to make the historic political and administrative decision by relocating the capital city of Indonesia, from Jakarta, located in Java (*Jawa*) island to Nusantara. The new capital city will build a novel city of Nusantara in Borneo (*Kalimantan*) island. Up to the present, Borneo Island was renowned for vast tropical forests. Building an infrastructure, support system, and connectivity development project with two other established cities will develop gradually from this year and will be expected to be finished by 2045.

On Borneo Island, the novel city of Nusantara, the new capital, will be constructed. The infrastructure, urban support, and livelihood development projects begin to take shape this year and are anticipated to be completed when the country will celebrate the centennial of its independence. On the one hand, there is the approach taken by the majority of political parties in the parliaments, according to which any presidential decision must receive the support of the majority of lawmakers.


¹ In the old Japan emporium (794–1868), Kyoto was the capital city. After 1868, the government moved to Edo and renamed it Tokyo. Whereas the first capital of the USA was New York when George Washington was the first President and moved to Philadelphia in 1792, and eventually Washington DC was the US capital since 1800 under President Adam. Germany relocated its capital from Bonn to Berlin following the unification of West and East German in 1990.

On the other hand, Jakarta's local government has maintained earlier local government aspirations for making the city a megapolitan with a vision for the hub commercial epicenter, a global 21st century city with digital transformation as its primary drivers. Jakarta, along with the neighboring urban enclave including Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi, Puncak, and Cianjur (abbreviation: *Jabodetabekpunjur*), is even already a part of the national strategic area as mandated by government regulation issued in 2017 (Hartono, 2022).

There is no doubt that moving the capital city is expensive, taking a huge amount of the nation's resources and will face uncertainties while the process phase takes place. However, this plan has an advantage over upgrading Jakarta through urban regeneration or most likely retrofitting vast green infrastructures. The plan involves significant expenditure where the goal is to establish a habitable urban environment to relocate the central government and other branches of government (legislative and judicative). Building a city from the ground up gives you the freedom to highlight creative urban design which, with the right urban planning and administration, can be economically, socially, and environmentally sustainable.

Figure 1 below illustrates how we analyze and discuss the main topics within our paper: capital transformation, city resilience, and collaborative governance. Capital transformation focuses on Nusantara, while city resilience emphasizes Jakarta, and collaborative governance draw its attention to both, Jakarta and Nusantara.

Figure 1. Framework of Analysis made by authors (2023)



Source: compiled by the authors.

There is numerous previous literature and studies either conceptually or empirically on collaborative governance. In particular, Rich and Stoker (2014) document an effort for urban revitalization taking several cases of US cities' empowerment zones with collaborative governance, defined as "the process that develops local plans and programs to complement market-oriented policies". Broadly speaking, collaborative governance involves both political actors from non-government and non-traditional stakeholders in the policy making process. A satisfactory definition that we propose is from Ansell and Gash² (2007, p. 544):

A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets.

In order to comprehend, we must look toward other developed regions, for example, in Europe's case, Houghton and Allmendinger (2015) propose a framework to analyze new planning and regeneration spaces. Their suggestion pointed out that we have to move forward on relational and territorial geographies, not to abandon spatial imaginaries, and establish novel regional identities as governance objects. Based on three cases of city regions in England, London-Thames Gateway, Atlantic Gateway which include Mersey Belt (Manchester and Liverpool) and Hull-and-the Humber ports, we may learn more deep and insightful concepts on evolving estuarial city-regional space. Moreover, recent governance of European experiences is documented in *the Soft Spaces in Europe* (2015), an edited book of which Allmendinger and his colleagues shared their thoughts and findings comparatively.

Our article aims to fill in the lacuna for larger audiences and academics interested in the politics of the biggest nation in the Southeast Asia. Furthermore, our humble expectation is to provide general audiences with three closely jointed themes in one chapter about cities in Asia. Several key questions that this study proposes: *first*, how the capital transformation may benefit particularly for Jakarta

² One important feature, Ansell and Gash stressed (2007, p. 544–545) six important criteria *with regards to definition collective governance (italic added by authors)*: (1) the forum is initiated by public agencies or institutions, (2) participants in the forum include non-state actors, (3) participants engage directly in decision making and not merely "consulted" by public agencies, (4) the forum is formally organized and meets collectively, (5) the forum aims to make decisions by consensus (even if consensus is not achieved in practice), and (6) the focus of collaboration is on public policy or public management.

and the national budget burden for development including near term impact and foreseeable long-term effects. *Thus*, this study illustrates how the Jakarta local government recognizes the city of Jakarta, now and then, from the point of view of city resilience. And *finally*, our article's goal is to discuss and suggest a starting condition for collaborative governance and how social capital may contribute progressively toward a soft space for future planning and development, harnessing Ansell and Gash's model, and thoughts from Allmendinger and colleagues with importance over social capital concept, as the Nusantara development is progressing.

2. Jakarta to Nusantara: Capital Transformation

Indonesia has tremendous potential to be a developed nation and become a major economic powerhouse in the region. The most influential era for Indonesia's sustained economic growth and political stability happened when General Soeharto, *primus inter-pares* the New Order regime was in power. At that time, Indonesia could gain a timely momentum from developing the nation's potential. However, the Asian economic crisis broke down the autocratic regime into disarray. Despite the regime's major deficiencies, economic performance in terms of higher economic growth, political stability and level of inequality, the New Order administration (1966–1998) could achieve a level that the current administration (2014–present) could not even gain. Additionally, Indonesia has to fight its longstanding reputation as an economic underperformer. Despite having an abundance of coal, metals, palm oil, and rubber, the Southeast Asian country has lagged behind its neighbors, Vietnam and The Philippines, in terms of its growth rate, averaging 4.3 percent³ over the past 10 years (Mokhtar, 2022).

The main *raison d'être* for pursuing national resources for building Nusantara is precisely the economic motive. It is to accommodate a tangible and future stream of economic benefits. In the long term, Nusantara is expected to become an economic super-hub driving the national economy. Looking at the pandemic situation, the capital project is planned as being among the strategies for economic

³ Economist Fadil Hasan presented that Indonesian economic growth had ended their high growth era, he recalled 1976–1981 before the oil crisis, when economic growth could achieve an average of 8 percent per year. In the period from 1988 to 1996, economic growth could achieve 7 percent per year. However, economic growth during the 10 years of the SBY administration *only* achieved 6 percent per year. Current administration economic growth is below these three previous eras with 5 percent per year.

recovery because, broadly speaking, the project development estimates to support Indonesia to achieve its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) target of US\$180 billion and will create 4,811,000 jobs in 2045 (Nugroho and Adrianto, 2022). On top of that, it is anticipated that the new capital city will promote equitable development. Development must be Indonesia-centric, or equitable across all of Indonesia⁴, as promised by President Widodo during election in 2019, so that nobody is left behind or stigmatized because of their location. This can be achieved by establishing an additional center of economic expansion outside Java.

Indeed, it is the rational decision for a country to decide on the relocation of its capital city. The Indonesian case has not been the first experience. Yet, it would not be the last example. Edward Schatz (2003) documented that there were 13 cases of capital relocation during the 20th century, starting with Brazil (1956) from former capital, Rio de Janeiro, to the new capital at Brasilia. Then, Indonesia's neighbor Malaysia followed other countries' footsteps, e.g., Mauritania, Pakistan, Botswana, Libya, Malawi, Belize, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Germany, and Kazakhstan, relocating from Kuala Lumpur to Putrajaya. The new capital location of Putrajaya can be considered to be accessible, because it is located within 20 kilometers from Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) and 25 kilometers from the old capital, Kuala Lumpur (Rachmawati et al., 2021).

There are two broad considerations to understand capital relocation: *the first* is the urban planning discipline which focuses on the requirement of a new capital city's novel urban development strategy or NUDP (Novel Urban Development Project). In essence, NUDP elaborates urban development aims for integration infrastructure via three mechanisms: one is encouraging harmonious policy and institution in the city development agenda; two is increasing integrated planning for city investment based on spatial planning framework; and three is formulating criteria and mechanism to prioritize investment, funding gaps, and enhance the local government's financial management capacity. *The second* is the political science discipline that builds the arguments that capital relocation is creating nations and a sense of national identity. Capital relocation is considerably more likely to appeal to elites in post-colonial contexts, when strong state bureaucracies and widespread national loyalty are lacking (Schatz, 2003). As a result, there is a strong link between efforts to form state-and-nation and the relocation of capital.

⁴ Term of equitability throughout Indonesia, see for instance: Menggeber janji kampanye Jokowi wujudkan Indonesia sentris - ANTARA News

Taking Kazakhstan as an example, Schatz (2003, p. 2) states two arguments: *firstly*, in comparison to other post-Soviet states (none of which moved their capital cities), Kazakhstan faced particularly severe state- and nation-building challenges in the early 1990s that had the potential to be extremely destabilizing; the move to Astana was intended to address these challenges. *Secondly*, many of these issues were crucially similar to those that many states in post-colonial Africa were dealing with.

Our analysis combines several issues around this decision from historical and political contexts of capital transformation, including presenting the public's attitude for capital transformation, and includes the elite stance for capital transformation. Technical issues include funding estimation and possible scenarios for an execution plan, while future populations and land requirement are needed for each possible scenario. The concept of moving the capital is not new. Properly implementing the plan and making it a reality may be the largest government effort in Indonesian history, both technologically and politically (Nugroho and Adrianto, 2022). Nugroho and Adrianto document a historical capital relocation plan from Soekarto to Jokowi. In the past, Palangkraya in Southern Kalimantan was firmly regarded as the capital by the country's first president, Soekarno, in 1957. Then, in reference to the center of the government, President Suharto issued Presidential Decree No. 1/1997 on the Coordination of Development of Jonggol area as an Independent City.

Following Reformasi 1998, this concept reappeared in 2013 during the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency, who provided two options: either keep the capital in Jakarta while allowing for planned and appropriate development or relocate the government's core outside of Jakarta. And it appears that Jokowi now wants to see the concept of capital relocation come to execution; not only finishing with planning.


The name for the future capital, which will be called "Nusantara", reflects the aspirations for its construction: locally integrated, globally connected, and universally inspired. In addition to serving as a marker of national identity and the future engine of Indonesia's economy, Nusantara strives to be the world's most sustainable metropolis⁵. Additionally, the move of the capital is an important part of the nation's structural transformation of Indonesia⁶. The relocation of the capital is

⁵ For further information, please visit: <https://ikn.go.id>

⁶ Jokowi: Pemandangan Ibu Kota Bagian Transformasi Indonesia - Medcom.id

a long-term and multi-year project that is bureaucratically and technically complex. According to the blueprint created by the Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas)⁷, there will be four steps to establish the Nusantara new capital as depicted below in Figure 2:

Figure 2. Establishing Nusantara. Source Nugroho and Adrianto (2022), illustrated by the authors (2023)



Source: compiled by the authors.

The anticipated cost of the Nusantara project is 466 trillion Indonesian rupiah (US\$30 billion)⁸, of which 110 trillion Indonesian rupiah would be needed for the first phase between 2022 and 2024. Although the government has repeatedly asserted that the development of Nusantara would not place an undue burden on the state budget because there are numerous financing options (the state budget, foreign loans, private investment, and public-private partnerships), this is a sizable state commitment that comes with a lot of missed opportunities. However, there is a skeptical view that policy agendas may be overlooked in the midst of responding to pandemic emergencies and long-term development planning. At the moment, Indonesia is dealing with significant public debt, a national budget deficit of more than 3 percent annually, and a reduction in state revenues. This has the natural effect of shifting the government's priority from pandemic recovery

⁷ Tahapan Perpindahan Ibu Kota Indonesia – DW – 29.01.2022

⁸ Quote report of Bappenas (2019), Hasan (2022) presents two scenarios over the Nusantara funding scheme: The first scenario has 40,000 hectares for land requirement, a five-year period of implementation, a population target of 1.5 million and an estimated cost of approximately US\$33 billion equal to 466 trillion Rupiahs. The second scenario has lesser land requirements, 30,000 hectares, a ten-year period of implementation, a lesser population target of 870 thousand and an estimated cost of approximately US\$23 billion equal to 323 trillion Rupiahs.

to a development agenda. The effects of the impending war between Russia and Ukraine must also be taken into account. According to forecasts, the global GDP will typically decrease by 1 percent while inflation would rise by 3 percent. Decisions made on investments and businesses will be directly impacted by this. Besides hard budget constraint, there is also concern over social disparities, rapid urbanization, and social conflict⁹. It is feared that moving the capital would lead to fresh inequalities and social unrest rather than promoting equitable employment opportunities and economic redistribution.

Bappenas estimates that Nusantara would be home to 127,000 civil servants. The plan for relocating civil servants will be materialized gradually up to 2027, excluding their immediate families and any connected service sector enterprises (Nugroho and Adrianto, 2022). Assuming one civil servant will bring at the minimum four family members, then Nusantara will be occupied by approximately 508,000 inhabitants, as a core of the new capital. The majority of this population will be upper middle class, and they will have to live side by side with lower middle-class residents of the current, primarily rural towns, as well as migrant workers from other parts of the country.

The elite support for the Nusantara project differs with societal response. In our study, the elite refers to the politicians along with those embedded with political decision making. New capital legislation unfortunately does not suffer from the hasty nature of the legislative process and the low level of public involvement. IKN (refers to *Ibu Kota Negara*) law was first discussed in the House on December 7, 2021; it was enacted into law on January 18, 2022, just 42 days later. Even for a strategic decision like this, the development process was far too rapid, and there was no public input during the hearing process. Therefore, IKN Law potentially breaches statutory restrictions and is unconstitutional, particularly those related to the formulation of laws based on the 1945 Constitution and mandated by previous Law No. 12/2011 on the Formation of Legislation (*Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang Undangan*). Any law is mandated for public consultations and meaningful participation with relevant stakeholders. Consequently, new law would require additional time for deliberation so that numerous civil society organizations and activists can give critical comments and input for refinement and substance of the law. In the case of the law, a civil society organization has currently

⁹ Public Administration expert from University of Indonesia Eko Prasajo argues that socio-cultural change will happen very quickly in the new capital which already has a potential for conflict (inews.id, 23/17/2019).

filed official litigation against IKN Law with the Constitutional Court. There is seen to be a serious flaw in the legislative process, which is why this lawsuit was brought.

In fact, it is an astonishing fact that private companies in the mining, forestry, and agriculture sectors, many of which have connections to eminent politicians and their relatives, already own the majority of the land in the Nusantara region. Additionally, there are overlaps between the mining and forestry zones in these concessions. There are 149 ex-mining pits (abandoned mining sites), 92 of which are located inside the administrative capital region, according to the Mining Advocacy Network (*Jaringan Advokasi Tambang, Jatam*) (Nugroho and Adrianto, 2022).

Indigenous communities that date back many generations may be displaced by Nusantara, as stated by the local tribal chief of the Indigenous Balik people, constituted by Sibukdin¹⁰. In Borneo, thousands of members of the Balik tribe depend on the forest to provide for their daily necessities. Since the 1970s, more than 90 percent of forest that the tribe needs for hunting and foraging has already been destroyed by commercial activities. Since the announcement of the capital's site, illegal encroachments have increased at an orangutan sanctuary that is home to some 120 apes and is located on territory designated for Nusantara's future expansion. The chief executive of the Borneo Orangutan Survival Foundation, Jamartin Sihite, stated that "mines and land speculators encroach on our place."¹¹ Based on previous evidence, the Indonesian central government has to involve broader key stakeholders from civil society representatives concerning the environment, local tribes, and animal preserving organizations. We focus the discussion over managing different interests in part 4 of this article, Collaborative governance.

Our argument for capital relocation could not substantiate the usual moving of state apparatus and building of new buildings for government officials. Rather, the capital transformation, from Jakarta to Nusantara, has to somehow function to nurture space and livelihood. Glaeser (2022) succinctly put an interesting observation: "Space is shaped by politics, and this was undoubtedly true during the time of the Caesars. One primate city—typically the national capital—dominates the urban systems of many developing-world nations." In the case of Nusantara,

¹⁰ Detailed story from Garbiano and Sagita (2023), see New Indonesia capital imperils ancient Eden with 'ecological disaster' (phys.org)

¹¹ Ibid.

the main driver for making it happen is surely the nation political actor decision. It is probably odd to Americans or Germans of the 21st century to understand that such supremacy may be a significant factor. It was the standard for a large portion of urban history, when the population followed power. Today's supremacy of Jakarta inside Indonesia is comparable to Edo within the seventeenth-century Japan or Baghdad within the Abbasid Caliphate in the 8th century (Glaeser, 2022).

3. City Resilience: Jakarta Overcoming Main Problems

Jakarta Mega Urban Region (MUR) has grown to be one of the biggest mega-urban zones in the world between 2000 and 2010. The story of population growth and redistribution in the MUR is similar to that of many MURs in Asia, with the urban core hollowing out like a doughnut and the surrounding ring experiencing rapid expansion (Jones and Douglass, 2008). An acronym for *Jabodetabek* is frequently used to refer to Jakarta MUR. The *Bodetabek* region of the Jakarta MUR now includes five municipalities (city of *Bogor*, *Depok*, *Tangerang*, *Tangerang Selatan*, and *Bekasi*) and three regencies (regency of *Bogor*, *Tangerang*, and *Bekasi*) dispersed over the neighboring provinces of West Java and Banten, with the province of Special Administrative Region or *Daerah Khusus Ibukota* (DKI) Jakarta¹² serving as its core.

The spatial boundary of *Jabodetabekpunjur* was indeed an extension over *Jabodetabek*, whereas there are two additional regions, namely Puncak and Cianjur. These regions are a part of a national strategic area as mandated by the government regulation issued in 2017. While the population of *Jabodetabek* as a whole, expanded from 17.1 million in 1990 to 27.9 million in 2010, the population of the Jakarta increased from 8.2 million in 1990 to 9.6 million in 2010, an increase of only 17 percent in two decades. *Bodetabek*'s population doubled in 20 years, from 8.9 million in 1990 to 18.3 million in 2010. Population increase is an early indicator for the city attracting human capital and agglomeration activities that might occurs, as based on other global cities stories (Glaeser, 2011). Vice versa, population decrease may serve as rapid proxy for a city's decline.

Additionally, by 2010, just over 90 percent of the MUR population was classified as urban, with the remaining 2 million rural residents being largely concentrated

¹² Status of Special Administrative Region or *Daerah Khusus Ibukota* is no longer valid for Jakarta, after the Law on IKN was passed by the Parliament from the initiative from the President.

in the regency of Tangerang, Bekasi, and Bogor. The socio-demographic disparities between the MUR's core and outside regions are certain to shift as a result of this rapid expansion (Jones et al., 2016).

Jakarta is susceptible to man-made disasters like pollution and excessive groundwater extraction as well as natural disasters like floods, rising sea levels, and other disasters. The city has a total land area of 662 square kilometers, 9.6 million residents, and an additional 2.5 million daily commuters from nearby locations (Firman et al., 2011). As a result, Jakarta serves as a draw for migrants—mostly impoverished migrants—looking for improved living conditions. Jakarta has experienced numerous climate-related disasters, most notably more frequent heavy rain floods, both in the upper region of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area and in the city itself, and tidal floods, despite the lack of conclusive evidence linking climate change or global warming to the city's heavy rain and sea level rise (Firman et al., 2011).

As OECD (2012) defines: a “resilient city is a city with the ability to absorb, recover and prepare for future shocks, coming from economic, environmental, social as well as institutional.” In addition, it promotes sustainable development, well-being, and inclusive growth. Our study benefits from harnessing previous studies to assess Jakarta's current condition over several natural disasters including floods, sea level rise, rapid urban development, and negative spillover in the form of traffic congestions (Firman et al., 2011; Padawangi and Douglass, 2015; Gaduh et al., 2021; Takagi et al., 2016).

The main objective for assessing these types of vulnerabilities is to explain how the Jakarta city resilience may evolve and this assessment gives an elementary reason for capital relocation to Nusantara. Indeed, the former capital city has a tiny percentage of Indonesia's total population which Jakarta contributes, only 3.89 percent of the country's total population, with six municipalities: Thousand islands, North Jakarta, South Jakarta, East Jakarta, West Jakarta, and Central Jakarta.


Floods

An examination of persistent floods in Jakarta, Indonesia's largest urban area, highlights the connections between natural ecologies and urban development, which inherently includes political and economic policy decision that blend with social and cultural values (Padawangi and Douglass, 2015). Both Kalibaru

Kelurahan (Sub-district) in the Cilincing Sub-district and Penjaringan Kelurahan in the Penjaringan Sub-district, which is one of the localities in North Jakarta, experienced the worst flooding in 2007 and subsequent flooding due to the rise in sea water. North Jakarta district is also burdened with the highest concentration of poor households (Susandi, 2009).

The number of floods in Jakarta that have been documented varies, although these days practically every heavy downpour result in flooding in at least some area. In its most immediate form, flooding either results from torrential rains that cannot be directed into the city's drainage system or from floodwaters that overflow from the Ciliwung River's upstream districts. When the population was low, the city would occasionally be completely shut down by a single severe flood, as happened in 2002, 2007, and again in 2013 (Padawangi and Douglass, 2015). A record number of 430,000 people was forced to leave their homes during the 2007 floods in Jakarta, which cost the city's infrastructure and other assets more than US\$900 million in direct damages (*Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction*, 2011; Steinberg, 2007).

To partially overcome the flooding issues, both central and local government had taken several measures. For example, a document from the government's National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction 2010–2012 (NAPDRR) identified inadequate storm water drainage systems as the primary contributor to the recurrent floods in cities across the country (Bappenas, 2010). Therefore, the government proposed several initiatives to partially overcome the flooding such as the building of the East Flood Canal that lies from Eastern part of Jakarta to Bogor, the building of the West Flood Canal that lies from Western to Northeast part of Jakarta, while other flood management facilities have been the subject of the subsequent policy and action initiatives in Jakarta (Haryanto, 2009). Beside flood management, there were additional initiatives such as the Jakarta Comprehensive Flood Management (JCFM), Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project/Jakarta Emergency Dredging Initiative (JUFMP/JEDI) (World Bank, 2014), and the coastal defense management plan assisted by the Dutch government, with a proposed gigantic sea wall in the coastal seas of Jakarta (Brinkman, 2012). All of these are yet to yield success in overcoming the Jakarta floods, partially solving them but not making the city and its citizen adapt to floods. Figure 3 depicts the number of flood-affected areas in Jakarta based on major flooding for selected years.

Figure 3. Total Flooded Hamlets by Year (in km²)

Source: Floods in number (*Banjir Jakarta Dalam Angka*¹³, 2021).

The most severe floods occurred back in 2007 and 2015 based on the above figure. Recently, there are increasing concerns about floods in Jakarta growing as a result of climate variability generating extreme weather conditions, such as unusually torrential rains. Firman and his colleagues (2011, p. 372, p. 375) conclude that the government of Jakarta's capital city lacked a climate change-specific policy. In general, the Jakarta City Government currently lacks a program or policy for climate change adaptation.

Jakarta city officials are also aware of the effects of climate change, but they still need to learn more about how to adapt to it. By equipping students with the technical abilities required to evaluate the susceptibility and risk of climate change, their understanding of climate hazards, vulnerabilities, risks, and resilience would be improved. After which, what the World Bank and foreign media refers to as "sinking Jakarta" is almost entirely caused by land subsidence. Sea level rise and the issue of land subsidence is discussed in the next part.

¹³ <https://www.instagram.com/p/CLmUnpMgHjZ/?igshid=Yzg5MTU1MDY> (Accessed: 22 January 2023).

Sea level rise and land subsidence

Jakarta's other environmental problem is sea level rise and land subsidence. This exponentially growing urbanization causes some environmental issues. One of these is the subsidence of land. Subsequently, the process and strategy for urban growth will be impacted by the resulting land subsidence (Abidin et al., 2011). For many years, there have been reports that different areas of Jakarta are sinking at different speeds. Several measurements, e.g., InSAR measurements, Global Positioning System (GPS) survey techniques, and leveling surveys (Abidin et al., 2011), have all been employed to create a study to examine ground subsidence in Jakarta between 1982 and 2010. In general, it was discovered that the pace of land subsidence varies both spatially and temporally, at roughly 1 to 15 cm each year. Some areas may have subsidence rates of up to 20–28 cm per year (Abidin et al., 2011).

Land subsidence resulting as side effects of urban development has also been reported for several cities, such as Bangkok (Phien-wej et al., 2006), Calcutta (Chatterjee et al., 2006), Taipei (Chen et al., 2007), Shanghai (Xue et al., 2005), and other cities in Indonesia such as Semarang and Bandung. However, compared to the previous sequence of cities in the area, which have all significantly slowed down recently, Jakarta's present subsidence rate looks to be the fastest (Takagi et al., 2016). A study comparing Jakarta's deteriorated land area, in the form of subsidence, was taken in several big Asian cities from Tokyo, Osaka, Taipei, Bangkok, Manila, and Jakarta.

Experts propose four causes, including the weight of structures and constructions, the natural consolidation of alluvium soil, and tectonic activity, which can all contribute to land subsidence in Jakarta. There is currently no information available regarding the geographic (contribution) variation of each factor's contribution to subsidence at each location. The tectonic activity appears to be the least significant factor affecting Jakarta, but excessive groundwater extraction is one of the major factors. The over-extraction of groundwater and the rise in skyscrapers, according to studies (World Health Organization, 2007), are the main causes of Jakarta's submergence. The increase in sea level in Jakarta Bay between 1925 and 2000 was measured at 0.57 cm per year (Padawangi and Douglass, 2015), however it has since been shown that this pace is now rising by at least 1 cm per year. Consequently, some 40 percent of Jakarta was already below high tide by the year 2007 (World Health Organization, 2009).

Traffic congestions

With a population of more than 31 million in 2015 (Gaduh et al., 2021), Jakarta MUR is one of the largest urban areas in the developing world. Due to fast motorization and poor urban planning, Jakarta, like many other rapidly expanding cities in Lower Middle-Income Countries (LMICs), experienced increasing traffic congestion. Similar to other cities in developing nations, buses are also often used in Jakarta; a BRT system would be a cost-effective enhancement that would increase mobility.

Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems that are less expensive and of inferior quality may be more appealing to LMIC cities with limited resources. A study by Gaduh and associates (2021) illustrates the risks associated with people's day-to-day decisions, including how poorly designed urban transportation infrastructure may fail to slow the growth of the automobile and instead exacerbate traffic congestion. Various traffic congestion indices compiled from GPS data have ranked Jakarta's traffic as the worst (or second worst) among the world's major cities (Castrol, 2015; Waze, 2016). In 2016, INRIX Global Traffic Scorecard ranked Jakarta 22nd out of 1064 cities in terms of peak hours spent in congestion, with 22 percent of overall driving time spent in congestion (INRIX, 2016).

Chronic traffic in Jakarta is a result of Jakarta's rapid growth and poor urban planning. Demand for private vehicles has increased as a result of income development, which is sometimes viewed as a sign of social status (Susilo and Joewono, 2017). The use of private vehicles has also increased as a result of national fuel subsidies and road development initiatives (Savatic, 2016; Hook and Replogle, 1996). Additionally, Jakarta's organizations in charge of land use and urban planning have typically failed to address the city's growing motorization (Susantono, 1998; Goldblum and Wong, 2000).

Despite being larger than other transportation means, Trans-Jakarta as a BRT operator uses less than 3 percent of the total road length in DKI Jakarta. Its corridors do not link employees residing in outlying municipalities to jobs in the city because they solely serve the DKI Jakarta area. Essentially, BRT systems have the advantage of being easier to expand and more affordable to build than other public transportation options like light rail or subways.

Trans-Jakarta experienced numerous service quality issues during the first few years of existence, which slowed down operations and lengthened wait times.

Firstly, BRT buses had a single front passenger door, which slowed the pace of boarding and disembarking passengers (Institute for Transportation and Development Policy, 2017). Secondly, Trans-Jakarta had a lot of issues coordinating the departure and arrival of buses at stations, which led to confusion and delays (Radford, 2016). Last but not least, Trans-Jakarta frequently neglected to implement bus lane segregation, especially outside of Corridor 1.

According to the study by Gaduh and associates (2021), Jakarta's BRT system had only minor effects on transit ridership while having little effect on the city's motorization incentives. Additionally, they demonstrate that the system did not enhance commuter flow. As the system grew, designers turned mixed-use lanes into BRT, which, in their opinion, increased rather than decreased congestion along service corridors. These three latent Jakarta's problems, human-made or climate-related, could be seen as the main reason and justification for capital transformation. Needless to say, the central government's promises that Jakarta would not be abandoned and left on its own will be kept. These promises reflect previous Jakarta's local government programs for overcoming floods, land subsidence, slowing sea level rise, and taming traffic congestions for tolerable condition, and central governance attentions are definitely directed to progress in Nusantara. Hence it is urgent for starting conditions to materialize in the collaboration between governments and other key stakeholders.


4. Collaborative Governance: The Importance of Starting Conditions

Our paper elaborates on collaborative governance in practice and theory. With three main urban problems, natural and man-made, e.g., heavy congestion, sea level rise, land subsidence and perpetual floods, the previous Jakarta local administration under Mayor Anies Baswedan (2017–2022) had launched and executed government policies and collaborated with other Jakarta stakeholders (Djohan, 2022). Under the Gubernatorial Decree number 24 in the Year 2020, collaborative governance has been a crucial framework, with a key instrument being the Jakarta Development Collaborative Network (JDCN). The JDCN acknowledges the importance of collaboration and at the time set, it tries to optimize five key stakeholders (*the pentahelix*): central government, local government, international developmental partners, the business sector, and society represented by the local civil society.

JDCN has introduced its visionary Jakarta Urban Regeneration 2030 with two fundamental policy transformations (Daud, 2019): The first, a transformational

vision and action from car-oriented development to transit. To foster this first transformation, the local government with central government support has anchored expansion and integration of rapid public transportation systems including Mass Rapid Transit (MRT, subway train), Light Rapid Transit (LRT, light train), and electric Bus Rapid Transit (e-BRT, electric busway). The second, a transformational policy from under-investment in basic services to rapid investment, a collaborative effort among businesses, international developmental partners, and local society to improve and achieve 60 priorities and accelerated programs such as: provision of affordable housing, collaborative green open space, universal access to clean water, and sustainable growth center. For the latter accelerated program, the Jakarta local government and national government have built an outer-loop line to connect Jakarta with 20 new sustainable growth centers, such as Dukuh Atas (international gateway), Lebak Bulus (transit village), Blok M (creative district), Manggarai (new interchange), Kanal Banjir Timur (riverfront city), and Jakarta International Stadium (sports and entertainment hub).

Figure 4. Nusantara location



Source: Tri Mulyani Sunarharum (2022).

It is promising that JDCN would continue local government priority programs in the future. Jakarta currently experienced a transitional leadership from 2022 to 2024, under the Acting Governor who is a direct representative of the central government. Jakarta would become a center for the nation, an economic center of gravity¹⁴, although Nusantara has become the capital of Indonesia and is in the process of building and capital transformation. Prior to the continuation of Nusantara from a collaborative governance perspective, Figure 4 illustrates Nusantara, an aim to provide readers with a sense of future site plan development and its location. Nusantara is located between two municipalities: Penajam Paser Utara and Kutai Kertanegara, between two developed cities: Samarinda (capital of East Kalimantan) and Balikpapan (East Kalimantan economic center).

In East Kalimantan, the Nusantara first phase development anticipates far more drastic effects. It is reasonable that the proposal of a new capital city is already causing developers to rush to grab land in East Kalimantan given the current situation, where chances of profit in Jakarta are slowing down (Bloomberg, 2019). Private sector development is promising. For example, PP Properti, a state-owned enterprise, stated that it was looking to develop about 500 hectares, while Wijaya Karya Persero, another state-owned specialized infrastructure and building, stated that it was prepared to take the lead in building everything from roads to power, gas, and water networks (Bloomberg, 2019). Agung Podomoro Land, a major private enterprise, is already advertising residential and commercial projects in Balikpapan.

It is obvious from the literature that pre-existing circumstances can encourage or discourage cooperation between agencies and stakeholders as well as among stakeholders. The crucial starting conditions may be summarized into three major factors: one is imbalances in the resources or power of various stakeholders, a second relates to the incentives for collaboration among stakeholders, and a third is the prior patterns of cooperation or conflict among stakeholders (Ansell and Gash, 2007). Our paper focuses on the starting conditions based on our understanding of two main facts. Firstly, the Jakarta local government had practiced a collaborative network in their government operation. Secondly, Nusantara itself is still in an early phase of its development. Then, we argue for the importance of starting conditions for Nusantara. Essentially, effective collaborative governance needs a commitment to a constructive approach of empowerment and

¹⁴ See for example, news: Anies: Jakarta Tetap Jadi Pusat Ekonomi Meski Tak Jadi IKN (idntimes.com)

representation of weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders, if there are severe power/resource disparities amongst stakeholders, such that important stakeholders can not engage in a meaningful way.

The capital transformation has to be a national priority among government, both central and local representatives, business entities, and the local community, without sidelining any parties' interests and concerns. The central government has to intensify constructive communication particularly within the local community and environment-based local civil society organizations. From our second part narratives, there is still divergence in opinion with regards to Nusantara development between preserving Borneo's forest and opening the new capital.

Therefore, it is crucial for government to engage with civil society organizations. Theoretically, there are two components for making it an incentive to participate in the process: 1) collaborative governance will only be successful if stakeholders believe they are very interdependent, even if there are other venues where they can pursue their objectives unilaterally; 2) sponsors have to be prepared to put in the effort necessary to convince alternative forums (courts, lawmakers, and executives) to respect and honor the outcomes of collaborative procedures if interdependence depends on the collaborative forum serving as an exclusive venue.

The central government has made a tremendous effort inviting foreign investment from the private sector to invest in the Nusantara development. However, the investor requires political support from the government. Accordingly, the 2024 national election result will not alter the Indonesian government's commitment for capital relocation. A lesson learned from England's case studies, Houghton and Allmendinger (2015) uncovered the complex relationships formed and reformed over time between relational and territorial forms of thinking and policy, as well as how these are used to build alternative spatial imaginaries with varying power to move hearts and minds. By starting to unpick the variety of discursive and material practices involved in attempting to translate them into strategies, institutions, and policies, the presented case study helps us understand how some imaginaries seemed to work better than others.

Thus, the third factor associates with the prehistory of antagonism and cooperation following the fundamental principle that collaborative governance is unlikely to succeed if there is a prehistory of animosity among stakeholders unless a) there is a high level of interdependence among stakeholders or b) proactive measures are taken to address the low levels of trust and social capital among the

stakeholders. To put it another way, a long history of war breeds mistrust, suspicion, and stereotyping. On the other hand, a track record of prior collaboration that was successful can generate social capital and high levels of trust that result in a fruitful cycle of cooperation.

Consistent with social capital concept, the spirit of active cooperation and participatory decision-making involving key-stakeholders can be regarded as a collective resource because increases in social capital can benefit all members of the community (Bourdieu, 1985; Portes, 1998). Alternatively, because of the individual benefits that can be obtained from group involvement, social capital can be viewed as an individual's resource (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1995). Eventually, development of the Nusantara capital transformation and 2030 Jakarta Urban regeneration would position Indonesia as a milestone of cooperation between government, societal, and business entities.

5. Conclusions

Previous studies on Indonesian capital relocation in the context of politics and public administration are rare. Our present study bridges this gap in the literature by suggesting three main conclusions. This article considers ongoing development and fact descriptions. Current conditions for Jakarta and future strategies of developing Nusantara have to be understood for a win-win situation, instead of two other evitable situations lose-win or lose-lose, as our article argues. Therefore, the government, as the main actor of economic and political changes, has to deliver promises for Nusantara and Jakarta into sound policies so that it can be conveyed into tangible and realistic outcomes.

Firstly, our study describes the capital transformation in that we argue capital transformation is beneficial for the distribution of economic dividend. Despite tangible development motives, there is growing substantial concerns over environment and possible local ethnicity. These problems have to be tackled seriously from the beginning phase. Moreover, our analysis combines a number of issues related to this choice from the historical and political context of capital transformation, presenting how the public sees and attitudes toward capital transformation, without forgetting the elite stances with regard to capital transformation.

Secondly, our study utilizes prior solid and various research, both academic or applied, in order to evaluate the current state of Jakarta in relation to a number of

natural calamities, such as floods, sea level rise, and negative urban growth spillovers including traffic congestion. Our primary goal in evaluating this kind of risk is to clarify how Nusantara’s capital move and Jakarta’s resilience are related. The Jakarta Development Collaborative Network recognizes the value of cooperation and works to maximize the interests of five important stakeholders: the central government, local government, developmental international partners, the private sectors, and the local civil society.

Thirdly, three major factors can be used to demonstrate the important initial condition for developing collaborative governance: the first is disparities in the resources or power of different stakeholders; the second is the motivation for cooperation among stakeholders; and the third is the history of cooperation or conflict among stakeholders. Without ignoring the interests or concerns of any party, the capital transformation must be a national priority for all levels of government, including central and local representatives, businesses, and the local community. With the local community and environmental-based civil society organizations in particular, the central government has urgently begun a more positive dialogue. According to our second-part analysis, there is still a disagreement about whether Borneo’s forest should be preserved or the new capital city opened when it comes to the development of Nusantara. Jakarta’s future as a city will never be the same once Nusantara eventually presents and makes its impact.

Table 1. Summary of conclusions

Capital transformation	City resilience	Collaborative governance
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is beneficial for distributing economic dividend, with major concerns acknowledged and solved • Environmental issues and potential local ethnicity problem need to be addressed for future Nusantara success 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jakarta has to overcome 3 perpetual problems simulatenously: floods, sea level rise and land subsidence, and traffic congestion • Continuing development of collaborative network and full support from central government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Starting conditiations are crucial for success • Previous works acknowledged power-resource knowledge of asymetrics, prehistory of cooperation or conflict as initial trust level, and incentives for and constraints to participate

Source: compiled by the authors.

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